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BEFORE THE
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                            SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD
                                STATE OF WASHINGTON
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   IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL
   DEVELOPMENT PERMIT DENIED, IN
   PART, BY KING COUNTY, H. A.
   DABROE,
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                                                            SHB No. 106
   H. A. DABROE,
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                       Appellant,
                                                     FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
                                                   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
7
              v.
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   KING COUNTY,
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                      Respondent,
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   STATE OF WASHINGTON,
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   DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY and
   SLADE GORTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
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                       Intervenors.
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Robert F. Hintz, Robert E. Beaty, the designee for the hearing of the

This matter, the request for review of a substantial development

permit issued by King County to H. A. Dabroe, came before the Shorelines

Hearings Board, Walt Woodward (presiding officer), Mary Ellen McCaffree,

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1 Association of Washington Counties, and Arden A. Olson, designee of Bert 2 Cole, at a formal hearing in the King County Courthouse, Seattle, 3 Washington, on April 18, 1974.

Appellant was represented by his attorney, Gordon A. Scraggin; respondent, King County, appearing through John E. Keegan, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney and intervenors, Washington State Department of Ecology and Attorney General appearing through Robert V. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General. Eugene Barker, Olympia court reporter, recorded the proceedings.

Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were admitted. Counsel for the parties made closing arguments.

The Board having considered the sworn testimony, exhibits, record and files herein, arguments of counsel and exceptions from appellant and respondent and the Board being fully advised in the premises, makes these FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

In April, 1955, appellant, H. A. Dabroe, purchased Lot 27 within the Vashon Island abandoned military reservation in Section 2, Township 21 North, Range 2 E.W.M., together with (qualified) tidelands of the second class in front thereof (Exhibit 11, Deed) in King County, State of Washington. Appellant moved onto Lot 28, then and since owned by him, adjoining Lot 27 on the west thereof, in 1952 when he started a continuing project of construction and improvement of the two said lots which front on the shoreline of Dalco Passage, Commencement Bay, Puget Sound, adjunct to Tahlequah Creek, Vashon Island, within King County, Washington. Appellant's residence is located on the easterly side of Lot 28 and a smaller residential house is located on Lot 27, both

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II.

Appellant's described property extends steeply uphill from shoreline northerly to a curving county road running generally west to east along the north lines of Lots 27 and 28 and thence southerly to the shoreline some four hundred feet or so to the east. A sharp curving access road leads into appellant's property from the east off of said county road. Total width of the property involved (east to west) is approximately 258 feet and has a varying depth from the south shoreline to the county road at the north of approximately 300 feet. At the time of commencement of appellant's construction and improvement of his property in 1952, and earlier, there existed a marshland on the northeast side of Lot 27 and extending east and over on a portion of the west side of Lot 26, adjacent to the east. At the northerly portion of this marshland a pond, generally referred to as a fish pond, existed for an unknown number of years prior to appellant's improvement projects and was drained by a meandering stream extending southerly over the east side of Lot 27 to the shore, exiting into the Puget Sound waters in a spreading fingers-like pattern to and over a large delta plain of the tideland in front of appellant's property. Prior to appellant's development projects the beach fronting his property was a Class II type sand and gravel beach, the uplands being sand, gravel and clay necessitating a retaining wall (east to west at the north of the buildings on appellant's property and south of the county road) to protect the property from slipping or sliding off the county road onto appellant's property.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 1

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Some years prior to appellant's purchase and commencement of improvement of his property in 1952 a breakwater of piling and planktype bulkhead (breaking the action of waves but allowing water through onto the beach above and back) had been constructed, extending east to west on the shore in front of appellant's Lots 27 and 28 at approximately the level of mean higher high water (11.9', USCGS datum).

Between 1955 and the summer of 1973, in a continuing bit by bit process, appellant commenced and completed construction and improvement work on his property (Lots 27 and 28) which included the following:

- (1) Construction of a concrete retaining wall (east to west) between the rear of appellant's residence buildings and the county road to the north to prevent slippage from the county road and earth to the north onto his property at the rear of his residence buildings.
- (2) Construction of a solid vertical face 8 feet high, 2 feet wide concrete bulkhead wall extending from west to east along a line some 45 feet seaward of the original wooden breakwater and enclosing a rectangular area in front of Lot 27 some 50 feet long with the south seaward wall thereof being at a level some 6 feet lower than the original mean higher highwater line. rectangular area extending out over the tideland water on the beach was first intended and used for a swimming pool and then was eventually filled in on the landward side thereof bringing the ground level up to the top of the surrounding bulkhead This area was then surfaced and intended for an emergency "heliport" but covered with lawn planting. Extending some 15 feet seaward from the south wall of the heliport area two concrete groin walls (2'x10'x6") have been installed some 25 feet apart.
- (3) Construction of a similar concrete wall extending from the south end of the east wall of the heliport area seward approximately ten feet, being about eleven feet long, referred to as a wing

<sup>27</sup> FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

wall protecting the front or seaward side of a boat ramp. The second similar wing wall was constructed seaward some ten feet plus to the east of the first wing wall and extending northeasterly joining the east wall of said boat ramp structure.

- (4) Construction of a five foot concrete culvert, confining and carrying the creek water from the above mentioned marshy area and pool area downhill under appellant's boathouse and boat ramp and exiting in a southeasterly direction into the waters of Puget Sound, altering the original flow of the creek and distribution of water and sediment over the delta plain of the tideland in front of appellant's property.
- (5) Filling in of the aforementioned marshland (partly done by the owner of Lot 26 but assisted by appellant with respect to construction of the culvert and covering thereof) to accomplish, in part, drainage of appellant's property and to assist in control of mosquitoes.

IV.

All of the construction and improvement work (excluding construction work on appellant's residence on the east side of Lot 28) described in Finding III above, was started and completed by and for appellant without having obtained any permit from King County or any other governmental agency. However, regarding construction that began in 1952 or 1955 he did contact the King County Building Department and was told that he did not need a building permit because of the piecemeal nature of the project. While originally the beach fronted by appellant's property was a Class I beach and tideland area (rapidly diminishing from the shorelines of the State of Washington) it was at least a Class II beach prior to the construction and development work done by appellant as hereinabove described and disclosed by the record herein. Appellant's said development of his property has caused the beach in front thereof to

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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Ideteriorate into a Class III beach by reason of: eliminating the natural backshore area and reducing the natural erosive characteristics of the shoreline site with extensive and substantial landfilling below the high water line; damaging fish (small pink salmon fry and chum), forcing them away from shallow waters adjacent to the beach out and around massive concrete bulkhead walls into deeper water where and while devoured and destroyed or diminished by larger fish predators; adversely affecting the aesthetic qualities of the beach and shoreline fronted by appellant's property by obliteration of the natural features of the original shoreline; substantially precluding or eliminating the public's right of enjoyment and use of the navigable waters fronted by appellant's property while adding to private use of the appellant; materially endangering natural development of the delta plain from the tideland fronted by appellant's property by altering sand and sediment movement as created by the natural action of the waves from the Sound and altering the course of natural drainage from the hillside landward.

v.

Appellant's fill and bulkheads, seawalls, wingwalls, groins, culvert and diversion of stream drainage of appellant's property, though accomplished on a bit by bit piecemeal basis over a period of approximately twenty years, was an ongoing project constituting a substantial development which is inconsistent with the policy section of the Shoreline Management Act (RCW 90.58.020) and the guidelines of the Department of Ecology.

VI.

Although some of the construction and other work listed in

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Finding III above was undertaken by appellant prior to the effective date of the Shoreline Management Act (June 1, 1971) the same was unlawful because the appellant had not procured permits from King County or the Corps of Army Engineers, therefore, WAC 173-14-050 does not exempt appellant from compliance with the permit requirements of the Shoreline Management Act. Nor has appellant otherwise established any right of exemption from the permit requirements of the Shoreline Management Act.

VII.

In addition to being unlawful (per Finding VI above) a major proportion of the appellant's development, hereinabove described, was substantially carried forward and completed after December 4, 1969, (date of decision in <u>Wilbur vs. Gallagher</u>, 77 Wn.2d 306), therefore being inconsistent and in violation of the rights of the public. Such development includes the bulkhead seawall on the east, west and southerly sides of the helicopter area, the landfill within the helicopter area and the groins and the wingwalls and posts protecting the boat ramp.

VIII.

While removal of the "improvements" consisting of the aforementioned bulkhead walls, the helicopter area, seaward of high tide line, including the bulkhead seawalls on the east, west and southerly sides thereof, the groins, and the wingwalls protecting the boat ramp launching structure, might not, alone, restore the beach area and the delta plain seaward thereof, to its original condition prior to such construction and "improvements" of appellant's property, without restoration of the stream from the aforementioned fish pond and marshy area, to the prior condition of the beach, shoreline, and delta plain area hereinabove described, the

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

continued existence of said concrete bulkheads, heliport area, seawalls, wingwalls, etc., as hereinabove described, together with fill behind the same, will, in terms of long time effects, materially and substantially alter and adversely affect the aquatic and marine life of the tideline area fronted by appellant's property and the use and enjoyment of the public of the (navigable water) displaced by appellant's landfill.

IX.

Any Conclusion of Law hereinafter recited which should be deemed to be a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Shorelines Hearings Board arrives at the following

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

The instant request for review was timely filed and the Shorelines Hearings Board has jurisdiction of this matter.

II.

The instant substantial development permit is consistent with RCW 90.58.020 and the guidelines of the Department of Ecology particularly with respect to protecting against adverse effects to . . . the waters of the State and their aquatic life, while protecting generally the public's right of the use and enjoyment of the navigable waters displaced by the appellant's property (Lots 27 and 28 as above described) and corollary rights incidental thereto.

III.

Any finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

From these Conclusions, the Shorelines Hearings Board makes the following ORDER The substantial development permit granted by King County for improvement of appellant's property and beach development is sustained and the appellant's appeal therefrom, by way of request for review, is hereby dismissed and this matter is remanded to King County with directions to proceed with enforcement of abatement and removal of that part of appellant's construction and improvements and development projects placed below the line of ordinary high water of Puget Sound subsequent to December 4, 1969 and those projects placed on the uplands subsequent to June 1, 1971. DONE at Lacey, Washington, this 25 day of SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD 

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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1		EFORE THE
2		S HEARINGS BOARD OF WASHINGTON
3	IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT ISSUED BY	) )
4	THE CITY OF PORT ANGELES TO THE PORT OF PORT ANGELES	
5		)
6	ALICE P. BALL,	) SHB No. 107
7	Appellant,	) FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
_	vs.	ORDER
O	CITY OF PORT ANGELES and	<u>'</u>
9	THE PORT OF PORT ANGELES,	
10	Respondents.	) )
11		- <b>'</b>

This matter, the request for review of a substantial development permit issued by the City of Port Angeles to the Port of Port Angeles, came before the Shorelines Hearings Board (Walt Woodward, presiding officer) in the Commissioners' Meeting Room, Clallam County Courthouse, Port Angeles, Washington, at 10:00 a.m., March 1, 1974.

Appellant appeared pro se; Port of Port Angeles through Tyler 18 Noffett, and the City of Port Angeles made no appearance. Richard Reinertsen, Olympia court reporter, recorded the proceedings.

Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were admitted.

Appellant and counsel made closing arguments.

From testimony heard, exhibits examined, arguments considered, transcript reviewed and exceptions denied, the Shorelines Hearings Board makes these

## FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

On July 30, 1973, the Port of Port Angeles applied for a substantial development permit under chapter 90.58 RCW, from the City of Port Angeles for dredging, bulkheading and filling for ship moorage at the Port's Terminal No. 1, in Port Angeles Bay, Washington. After due public notice and at a public hearing, the City Council of the City of Port Angeles approved the permit on September 18, 1973. On October 15, 1973, appellant filed a request for review of the permit with the Board and on November 9, 1973, both the Attorney General and the Department of Ecology certified the request for review as reasonable.

II.

By stipulation of appellant and the Port of Port Angeles, the shorelines of Port Angeles Harbor are of state-wide significance.

III.

Appellant failed to prove that the permit is inconsistent with chapter 90.58 RCW or WAC 173-16. As of September 18, 1973, there was not in existence any discernible or ascertainable master program of the City of Port Angeles.

IV.

If The City Council of the City of Port Angeles, in granting the FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT.

permit failed to consider environmental factors of the proposed project as required by chapter 43.21C RCW, did not submit a finding of no significant environmental impact and did not prepare or consider an environmental impact statement.

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v.

An Conclusion of Law hereinafter recited which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings, the Shorelines Hearings Board comes to these
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

The Shorelines Hearings Board has jurisdiction under chapter 90.58 RCW to review the permit and asserts jurisdiction to consider environmental aspects as specified in chapter 43.21C RCW.

II.

Uncontroverted testimony convinces this Board that the City Council of the City of Port Angeles granted the permit with total disregard for environmental factors and that this disregard is a violation of chapter 43.21C RCW, thus making the permit null and void.

III.

Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

Therefore, the Shorelines Hearings Board issues this

ORDER

The substantial development permit issued by the City of Port Angeles on September 18, 1973 to the Port of Port Angeles is hereby recated without prejudice.

27 (FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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DONE at Lacey, Washington this 28th day of May SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD HINTZ, Member 

| FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 27 | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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# BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT ISSUED BY SNOHOMISH COUNTY TO EDWARD W. HAYES 2 GEORGE YOUNT and STATE OF 3 WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY SHB Nos. (108 and SLADE GORTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 4 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Appellants, 5 AND ORDER vs. 6 SNOHOMISH COUNTY and EDWARD W. HAYES, Respondents. კ 9

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THESE MATTERS being consolidated requests for review to the issuance of a conditional shoreline management substantial development permit; having come on regularly for hearing before the Shorelines Hearings Board on the 6, 7 and 8th days of March, 1974, at Everett, Washington; and appellant, Washington State Department of Ecology and Attorney General, appearing through its attorney, Thomas C. Evans, Assistant Attorney Genera appellant, George Yount, appearing through his attorney, J. Grahame Bell; respondent, Snohomish County, appearing through Darrell Syferd, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney; and respondent, Edward W. Hayes, appearing through

this attorney, Bill Baker; and Board members present at the hearing being W. A. Gissberg (presiding), Mary Ellen McCaffree, Arden A. Olson and Robert F. Hintz; and the Board having considered the sworn testimony, 3 exhibits, post-hearing arguments, records and files herein and having entered on the 24th day of April, 1974, its proposed Findings of Fact, 5 Conclusions of Law and Order, and the Board having served said proposed 6 Findings, Conclusions and Order upon all parties herein by certified 7 mail, return receipt requested and twenty days having elapsed from said 8 service; and 9 The Board having received no exceptions to said proposed Findings, 10 Conclusions and Order; and the Board being fully advised in the premises; 11 now therefore, 10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said proposed 13 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated the 24th day c 14 April, 1974, and incorporated by this reference herein and attached 15 hereto as Exhibit A, are adopted and hereby entered as the Board's 15 Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein. 17

DONE at Lacey, Washington, this 22ad day of May, 19

SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD

MARY ELLEN MCCAFFREE, Nember

ARDEN A. OLSON, Member

ROBERT F. HINTZ Member

ROBERT F. HINTZ Member

W. A. GISSBERG, Member

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

27 AND ORDER

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## BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT ISSUED BY SNOHOMISH COUNTY TO EDWARD W. HAYES 3 GEORGE YOUNT and STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY and SLADE GORTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SHB Nos. 108 and 112 Appellants, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 6 vs. AND ORDER SNOHOMISH COUNTY and EDWARD W. HAYES, Respondents.

A hearing on the consolidated above-numbered requests for review to the issuance of a conditional shoreline management substantial development permit was held in Everett, Washington on March 6, 7 and 8, 1974 before Board members, W. A. Gissberg (presiding), Mary Ellen McCaffree, Arden A. Olson and Robert F. Hintz.

Appellants Washington State Department of Ecology and Attorney General appeared through Thomas C. Evans, Assistant Attorney General; appellant George Yount appeared through his attorney, J. Grahame Bell; Respondent Snohomish County appeared through Darrell Syferd, Deputy

EXHIBIT A

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Prosecuting Attorney; respondent Edward W. Hayes appeared through hattorney Bill Baker.

Having heard the testimony and considered the exhibits and posthearing arguments, and being fully advised, the Board makes and enters these

#### FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

That any Conclusion of Law hereinafter recited which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

II.

Edward W. Hayes and others own a combined unimproved land area (site) of 93 acres. On March 10, 1970 he applied for a permit under RCW 86.16 (flood control zones) to construct and maintain a "sanitary landfill" on the site. Shortly thereafter he was granted a flood control permit to construct and maintain a "solid waste disposal site" (App. Ex. 70). At least since then he has utilized a portion of the site for that purpose and has now filled ten acres to a nine foot elevation, using approximately 100,000 yards of solid waste in the process. Apparently only nonputrescible wastes have been placed upon the site and much of it consists of discarded wood products and debris resulting from construction demolition. That portion of the site east of Interstate Highway 5 used as a disposal area is an eyesore and can best be described in its present condition as having been esthetically molested.

III.

The site is located in Snohomish County between the northerly

27 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \*\* \*AMD-ORDER

northerly boundary is Ebey Slough; its southerly boundary is Steamboat Slough; its westerly boundary is the Tulalip Indian Reservation. The site is bisected by Interstate Highway 5, old Highway 99 and railroad trackage and right of way, all of which were respectively constructed on elevated fill. The materials for the freeway construction were obtained from a borrow pit which was located on that portion of the site westerly of I-5.

Dikes were constructed around three sides of the property at about 1891 to protect the site and other property from water inundation by tide and the waters of Ebey and Steamboat Sloughs. The site was farmed until around 1959 at which time a break in the Ebey Slough dike occurred. Since than a portion of the site is covered daily by the tide water flowing through the breaks in the dike. That flow of salt water has scoured a channel from Ebey Slough into the portion of the site lying easterly of I-5.

IV.

Ebey and Steamboat Sloughs are portions of the Snohomish River, tributary to Puget Sound, and are shorelines of state-wide significance. According to the 1966 study of the Corp of Army Engineers, the site is within the 50 year flood plain. A more recent study by the Corps, the results of which are only tentative and subject to revision, leads to a finding that the site is not within the flood plain but that it is subject only to tidal flooding. At any event, the flood water storage of the site is insignificant and the filling of the ite would not significantly affect the flood plain water storage

<sup>27</sup> FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FIND ORDER

1 capacity because the site is such a small part of the Snohomish River 2 flood plain.

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Respondent applied for a substantial development permit on March 26, 1973. Simultaneously he filed his "environmental impact statement" (App. Ex. 55). His shoreline management application sought a permit for a solid waste landfill and "continue to expand transshipping capabilities and heavy industrial use." His publication of the notice of hearing on the application stated the proposed development to be a "marine industrial area". The "final environmental impact statement" (App. Ex. 57) describes the proposed permit to be for "landfilling, channel extension, two docks, dredging, a future railroad spur and construction of a steel fabrication facility". A site plan and vicinity map was included in the material filed by respondent with his application.

VI.

The county commissioners, after a public hearing, approved a shoreline management substantial development permit "for operation of a solid waste landfill and marine industrial area", with the condition that "only nonputrescible wastes. . . be allowed" in the landfill.

That condition was not expressed upon the face of the permit but is found in the resolution approving the granting of the application for a permit. The planning staff and commission had recommended disapproval of the application, but their findings and recommendations were considered and rejected by the county commissioners.

26 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

27 AND ORDER

VII.

The site has been zoned heavy industrial since 1962. Immediately north and across Ebey Slough from the site there are three lumber mills and a boat marina and other highly urbanized facilities. A large area westerly of the site is now being used as a solid waste sanitary landfill in which Seattle's garbage is being dumped. Easterly of the site and within the planning jurisdiction of Snohomish County, there is no other land in the Snohomish River estuary which has been zoned heavy industrial.

VIII.

A solid waste landfill containing only nonputrescible wastes can cause leachates. The subsoil of the site is relatively impermeable, thus causing any leachates to move horizontally. There is no evidence that leachates from this site would have a deleterious effect on the adjacent waters.

IX.

Studies and projections by experts prove only that there is a divergence of opinion as to the need for additional industrial sites.

X.

The hundreds of acres of land in the estuary of the Snohomish River constitutes a fragile ecosystem. About one-half; i.e., 46 acres, of the site is a salt water marsh habitat. The dike contains a muskrat habitat. Although a filling of the site would mean a loss of a portion of the total estuary, the ecological or environmental impact of a fill would be insignificant. However, the cumulative effect of other such developments would cause irreversible damage to the ecosystem of the estuary at some

7 FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF 1

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1 |unknown and unpredictable stage of development.

Wolf Bauer, recognized as an expert naturalist, engineer and geologist found that the area of the site which is located westerly of I-5 would be acceptable for a fill and industrial area, because that area has lost its appeal "environmentally." However, his opinion was that the 57 acres easterly of I-5 was beyond a natural planning boundary upon which further encroachment of the natural estuary condition of the Snohomish River should not be allowed.

XI.

The site is not economically suitable for agricultural purposes and such a land use is not a viable option. The development plan proposed for the site does provide for the retention of the natural esthetic qualities of the existing dikes, but that proposal, although salutory has not been made a condition of the permit.

XII.

The environmental impact statement does not consider the availability of alternate marine industrial sites.

XIII.

The substantial development permit was granted on September 10,
1973. As of that date, there had been no adoption of goals and
policies or other elements of the master programs either by the Planning
Commission or the County Commissioners of Snohomish County for the
shorelines therein. Thus, there was no ascertainable or recognizable
master program as of the date of the issuance of the permit.

26 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 27 AND ORDER

# CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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Any Finding of Fact, which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

II.

The dispositive guideline in this case is that of the Department of Ecology found at WAC 173-16-060(14)(c). It provides:

> ". . . (c) Fill materials should be of such quality that it will not cause problems of water quality. Shoreline areas are not to be considered for sanitary landfills or the disposal of solid waste." (emphasis supplies)

RCW 70.95.030(9) provides:

"'Solid waste' means all putrescible and nonputrescible solid and semisolid wastes including . . . industrial wastes, . . demolition and construction wastes, . . . and discarded commodities."

We interpret the above guideline to mean and hold that it mandatorily prohibits the disposal of solid wastes within the shoreline areas.

III.

Not every landfill is prohibited by the guidelines, however. WAC 173-16-060(14) provides for and permits the approval of certain landfills which are of the type, location, design and effect therein described. We are concerned about establishing a precedent of allowing fills in that portion of the Snohomish River estuary which is within the planning jurisdiction of Snohomish County and at those places which would be an invasion of that part of the estuary easterly of I-5. However, the Order to be entered in this cause will not be precedence setting because

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

respondent's filling activity had lawfully commenced prior to the effective date of the Shoreline Management Act and had been lawfully continued for two years thereafter. The public generally, and respondenspecifically, is faced with a situation where, if a permit be not granted the site will continue to be an eyesore. However, the granting of a permit for a fill on a portion of the site, but not using solid waste as a fill material, would be in the public interest and consistent with the policy section of the Shoreline Management Act and the quidelines if designed and constructed in accordance with WAC 173-16-060(14). the ultimate development of a portion of the site, when filled, priority should be for a water-dependent use.

IV.

RCW 90.58.020 states that "industrial and commercial developments which are particularly dependent on their location on or use of the shorelines of the state" shall be given priority in those limited instances where "alterations of the natural conditions of the shorelines of the state" is allowed. Because the subject permit is too vague to ascertain, with the certainty required by this Board, what it authorizes, we are unable to determine the issues of this case relating to water-It is our view that a water-dependent commerce or industry, to which priority should be given, is one which cannot exist in any 22 other location and is dependent on the water by reason of the intrinsic 23 hature of its operations. A water-related industry or commerce is one 24 which is not intrinsically dependent on a waterfront location but whose 25 operation cannot occur economically without a shoreline location.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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If local government issues a permit upon certain conditions, those conditions should appear on the permit itself or by reference stated therein and with the reference attached thereto. The failure of snohomish County to issue permits in that form can only lead to further controversy and uncertainty not only to the public but to the permittee as well. The Board makes the same criticism of the subject matter of the permit. We are urged to find that the purpose and scope of the permit is to be found in the environmental impact statement. We refuse to do so. The permit itself should describe with particularity and certainty what is being authorized. The description on the subject permit as a "marine industrial area" does not meet our test when no further explanatory material is attached to or expressly made a part of the permit.

### VI.

Our review of the question of whether the permit is consistent with the master program "so far as can be ascertained" (RCW 90.58.140 (a) (iii)) is necessarily limited to the status of the master program as of the date of the issuance of the permit by the local government. At that time Snohomish County's master program was not ascertainable.

## VII.

The specific permit which is the subject matter of this review should be vacated, but a permit should be granted in accordance with the principles set forth herein.

#### ORDER

The permit is vacated and the matter is remanded to Snohomish

27 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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1	County for its reconsideration of the issuance of a permit which is
2	in accordance with these Findings and Order and which is limited in
3	area to only that part of the site which would cover over the existing
4	solid waste landfill located easterly of I-5.
5	DATED this 24th day of April , 1974.
6	SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD
7	
8	MARY ELLEN McCAFFREE, Member
-	$G \cap G \cap A$
10	ARDEN A. OLSON, Member
11	
12	K-lenk f. Huit
13	ROBERT F. HINTZ, Member
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15	Having personally written the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
16	of Law, I agree and concur with them. I also concur with the Order,
17	as far as it goes. However, I would allow respondent to also fill
18	that area westerly of I-5.
19	1/1/6/1
20	W A GISSBERG Member
21	W. A. GISSBERG, Member
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26 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 27 AND ORDER